The debate by Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB; 2013, EEL) on 'the effect of foreign aid on corruption' in its current state has the shortcoming of modeling corruption as a direct effect of development assistance. This note extends the debate by assessing the channels of foreign aid to corruption in 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. Two main findings are established to unite the two streams of the debate. (1) Foreign aid channeled through government's consumption expenditure increases corruption.
Introduction
The debate by Okada & Samreth (2012) and Asongu (2012 Asongu ( , 2013a on 'the effect of foreign aid on corruption' has had an important influence in policy and academic circles. In its current state, the debate lacks a unifying framework. Accordingly, both proponents in the debate have the drawback of modeling corruption as a direct effect of development assistance.
Consistent with Knack & Keefer (1995) 1 , we argue that investigating institutional quality as a direct consequence of aid may be misleading in terms of policy implications because it fails to account for mechanisms through which development assistance is channeled. In uniting the two streams, we argue that investment and fiscal behavior channels are crucial in better understanding the relationship between development assistance and corruption. From an investment perspective, consistent with Easterly (2005) , 'Big Push' (Harrod-Domar and Solow growth) models which constitute the main theoretical underpinnings in the aid literature are based on the need for substantial aid-financed improvements in investment in order to bridge 'poverty and development' gaps. From the fiscal behavior dimension, it is common sense to acknowledge that development assistance affects fiscal behavior in terms of government expenditure and tax effort.
The debate can be highlighted in three main strands. In the first, Okada and Samreth (O & S) have investigated the relationship in 120 developing countries for the period 1995-2009 and concluded that aid generally reduces corruption and its reduction effect is greater in less corrupt countries. As a direct response, Asongu (2012) has partially negated their criticism of the mainstream approach to the aid-development nexus. Using data from 52
African countries for the period 1996-2010, he has established that development assistance fuels (mitigates) corruption (the control of corruption) in the African continent. Hence, has concluded that the O & S findings for developing countries may not be relevant for Africa. In the third strand, some scholars have informally pointed-out the lack of fiscal policy and investment channels in the debate. Accordingly, the debate in its present state has not deviated from the Fielding et al. (2006) stance on a straight forward nexus between aid and development. Hence, consistent with Knack & Keefer (1995) who have concluded that more indicators are needed to properly account for the quality of institutions, we further extend the debate by providing an indirect dimension to the relationship with the help of transmission mechanisms.
The fiscal behavior and investment channels in the aid-corruption relationship are consistent with the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the aid literature (Rostow, 1960; Chenery & Strout, 1966; Mosley et al., 1992; Reichel, 1995; Boone, 1996; Gomanee et al., 2003; Mosley et al., 2004; Easterly, 2005; Addison et al., 2005; Morrissey, 2012) . From a theoretical standpoint, as highlighted above, the 'Big-Push' model on which foreign aid is based suggests that Africa is poor because it is stuck in poverty and institutional traps (Easterly, 2005) . To emerge from these traps, it needs a substantial aid-financed increase in investment: a 'Big Push'. Both the Harrod-Domar and the Solow growth models have been used to substantiate these channels. The underlying assumption in this theoretical underpinning is the notion that the 'Big Push' is destined to bridge the saving-investment gap poor countries face (Rostow, 1960; Chenery & Strout, 1966; Easterly, 2005) . On the empirical front, in examining the effect of development assistance, a substantial bulk of studies has focused on the impact of aid-flows on GDP growth and other macroeconomic variables (investment or public consumption). For instance, Gomanee et al. (2003) have concluded that development assistance has both a direct effect on welfare and an indirect impact via social services and public spending. The indirect dimension has been supported by Mosley et al. (2004) on poverty and wellbeing in recipient countries. Development assistance has also been found to encourage unproductive public consumption (Mosley et al., 1992) without increasing investment. This latter point has been confirmed by Reichel (1995) and Boone (1996) . Addison et al. (2005) have also found aid to strengthen pro-poor public expenditure.
Accordingly, donors are concerned about how their development assistance is used, especially the manner in which it affects the fiscal behavior of recipient countries because aid and fiscal behavior are linked via government spending and tax effort (Morrissey, 2012) .
In light of the above channels of foreign aid, two mechanisms clearly standout from the theoretical and empirical underpinnings: investment and fiscal behavior channels.
Therefore, the goal of this note is to extend the debate on the 'effect of foreign aid on corruption' with the mechanisms. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and outlines the methodology. Section 3 covers the empirical analysis and corresponding discussion. We conclude with Section 4.
Data and Methodology

Data
We examine a panel of 53 African countries with data from the African Development Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB) for the period 1996-2010. Limitations to African countries and periodicity are consistent with the underpinnings of the debate 2 . The dependent variable is the corruption perception index (CPI), consistent with the debate (Asongu, 2012 (Asongu, , 2013a Okada & Samreth, 2012) .
The theoretical and empirical underpinnings for the endogenous explaining variables (channels) have already been substantially covered in the fifth paragraph of the introduction.
Hence, we use private investment and fiscal behavior channels (government's final consumption expenditure and tax revenues) in line with the literature (Rostow, 1960; Chenery & Strout, 1966; Mosley et al., 1992; Boone, 1996; Addison et al., 2005; Reichel, 1995; Easterly, 2005; Morrissey, 2012) . respectively. The 'descriptive statistics' of the variables shows that, there is quite a degree of variation in the data utilized so that one should be confident that reasonable estimated relationships would emerge. The purpose of the correlation matrix is to mitigate issues of overparametization and multicolinearity. From an initial assessment of the correlation coefficients, there do not appear to be any serious issues in terms of the relationships to be estimated.
Methodology
The adoption of a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation technique has a twofold justification: while addressing the issue of endogeneity, the IV estimation underpinnings are in accordance with the problem statement of the note.
Our concern for endogeneity is valid for two main reasons. Firstly, the CPI is a perception based measure that could be subject to public opinion bias (due to media propaganda for example), therefore concerns of measurement error and omitted variables. Secondly, whereas fiscal behavior and investment affect corrupt practices, corruption also affects private investment and government fiscal policies (as the current situation in Greece), hence the issue of reverse causality.
The estimation procedure involves the following steps.
First-stage regression:
Second-stage regression: 
Empirical analysis
Presentation of results
This section examines two main concerns: (1) the capacity of the exogenous components of investment and fiscal behavior mechanisms to explain corruption and; (2) the ability of the foreign aid instruments to explain corruption through the proposed channels 4 .
Whereas the first concern is tackled by the significance and signs of estimated coefficients, 4 The direct effects of foreign aid on corruption have already been demonstrated in the literature (Asongu, 2012 , Asongu, 2013a . There is no need to do this any longer because Asongu (2012) has used an IV estimation technique to show the perilous character of foreign aid on corruption in 52 African countries for the same period (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) . Accordingly, the scope of the debate is already firmly settled and the present positioning only extends the existing debate by means of indirect effects and fiscal policy behavior mechanisms. We are using the same database, the same set of countries and the same periodicity as in the studies motivating this extension.
the second issue is addressed with the Sargan OIR test. The null hypothesis of this test is the stance that the aid instruments explain corruption only via the proposed channels. Therefore, a rejection of the null, is a rejection of the view that the instruments do not explain corruption beyond the mechanisms. A Hausman test precedes the 2SLS-IV estimations. The null hypothesis of this test is the view that estimated coefficients by OLS are efficient and consistent. Therefore, a rejection of this null hypothesis points to the concern of endogeneity due to inconsistent estimates, hence, justifies the choice of the IV estimation strategy. Owing to the problem statement of this note, the Hausman is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the IV approach. Therefore, the 2SLS is still employed even in the absence of endogeneity. One of the significant control variables has the expected sign: economic prosperity in African countries has been found to increase corruption irrespective of initial corruptioncontrol levels (Asongu, 2013b, pp. 43-44) . The fact that inflation reduces corruption (in Panel B) is contrary to intuition. This is because we intuitively expected inflation to broadly encourage public officials to seek more rents in a bid to cope with rising prices. However, it is also interesting to note that, foreign aid could increase demand pull inflation that eventually decreases corrupt practices because of a general increase in the revenues of public officials who may no longer see rent seeking as the sole means of making ends meet. The interpretation is contingent on the hypothesis that the public officials formerly seeking rents expect aid flows to continue in the future. 
Discussion
A substantial bulk of development assistance literature has concluded that Africa is poor because it is deficient of good institutions: weak courts and contract-enforcements, lack of property rights, dictatorships, hostile regulatory environment for private business and high corruption and; political instability (Easterly, 2005; Kodila-Tedika, 2012 , 2013 . With respect to this strand, in order to end poverty in Africa, the West needs to promote good institutions in the continent. With the growing concern over how aid could promote good institutions in aidrecipient countries, a great chunk of the literature has focused on how the quality of institutions matter in the effectiveness of foreign aid (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Alesina & Weder, 2002; Knack, 2001; Dixit, 2004; Djankov et al., 2005) . From this interesting literature on aid and institutions, for over five decades the debate on the political economy of foreign aid has centered around three main questions. First, do donors allocate more to poor states with better institutions? Second, does development assistance induce better or worse institutions? Third, how do outsiders engineer a transition from informal institutions towards more formal institutional settings through foreign aid? This note has focused on the second strand of the challenges in the literature by extending an ongoing debate on 'the effect of foreign aid on corruption'. Based on the available weight of empirical evidence, we have found that foreign aid that is aimed at reducing corruption should be channeled via private investment and tax effort, not through government expenditure.
It is relevant to provide an in depth explanation on the instrumentality of foreign aid in the proposed channels. Firstly, it is not contrary to intuition to establish that corrupt politicians and/or government officials would try to channel development assistance funds to those expenditures that provide more lucrative opportunities for bribery and rent seeking. This interpretation is consistent with the literature sustaining that corrupt officials will choose to spend money (especially foreign aid) on goods whose true value is difficult to be identified by agents (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993) . Secondly, the negative relationship between tax effort and corruption is in accordance with the bulk of studies that has argued that a more legitimate and responsive state (with respect to voice & accountability and corruption-control) is an essential factor for a more adequate level of tax effort in developing countries (Bird, 2007) . Accordingly, the requirement by Western agencies for recipient institutions to be more accountable to development assistance may lead to increased tax effort on two main counts.
On a first note, authorities in place may want to demonstrate that they need grants because their tax revenues are not enough to finance government projects and hence, prove that current tax efforts are not tainted by corrupt practices. On a second note, depending on the composition of aid, concessional loans are associated with higher domestic revenue mobilization to service the loans (Benedek et al., 2012) . Thirdly, it is logical to expect aid channeled through private investment to mitigate corruption because, it could be assimilated to foreign direct investment that has been documented to reduce corruption in developing countries (Larrain & Tavares, 2004) . Moreover, private investments have been documented to be negatively correlated with corruption in comparison to public investments in Africa (Baliamoune-Lutz & Ndikumana, 2008) .
Before concluding, it would be interesting to highlight how the findings reconcile the debate. Accordingly, the Okada & Samreth (2012) and Asongu (2012 Asongu ( , 2013a debate has centered along two main axes. Whereas the former has presented a case for the negative effect of aid on corruption in developing countries, the latter has rejected the findings from an African standpoint. Our results have integrated an indirect transmission mechanism and reconciled the debate by showing that, the effect could either be positive or negative depending on the transmission mechanism. Therefore whereas the 'government's final consumption expenditure' mechanism is in line with Asongu (2012 Asongu ( , 2013a , the 'tax effort'
and private investment channels are consistent with O & S.
Conclusion
The debate by Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB; 2013, EEL) on 'the effect of foreign aid on corruption' in its current state has the shortcoming of modeling corruption as a direct effect of development assistance. This note has extended the debate by assessing the channels of foreign aid to corruption in 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. Two main findings have been established to unite the two streams of the debate.
(1) Foreign aid channeled through government's consumption expenditure increases showing that, the effect could either be positive or negative depending on the transmission channel. 
